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Abstract
The rationales for corporate risk management are examined from the point of view of the theory of finance and 
of key stakeholder groups’ interests. A study of the use of hedging instruments in 161 Polish non-financial listed 
companies is then presented. The study is based on keyword analysis of financial statements; parametric tests 
and logit regression are used to determine relationships between the hedging decision and financial standing of 
companies.  However,  company size  is  proved to be the only significant  factor  for  a  hedging decision.  The 
implications of these findings and new research questions are discussed in the conclusion.
1. Introduction
In recent years the issue of risk  management has been gaining growing interest and 
support among both academicians and corporate managers around the world. As a result, the 
number of publications and various approaches to this issue has been becoming ever larger. 
Nevertheless, the basic questions, of the both positive and normative nature, pertaining to risk 
management remain without an ultimate answer. Among them are the bottom-line problems: 
What motivates companies and their managers to engage in risk management? Do companies 
profit from it, or maybe only their managers do? Do shareholders profit from it? Does it raise 
value? Does it benefit also other stakeholders? In this article an attempt is made to analyze the 
rationales  for  risk  management,  or  more  accurately,  for  corporate  hedging.  The  paper  is 
organized as follows. In the first section, theoretical rationales for hedging are discussed on 
the  basis  of  the  theory  of  corporate  finance  and  stakeholder  theory.  The  second  section 
presents  results  of  a  study  carried  out  on  the  basis  of  financial  statements  of  Polish 
non-financial listed companies. The aim of the study was to determine how popular hedging 
was in Poland, and which of the rationales, discussed in the preceding section, seemed to 
motivate  Polish  companies  to  undertake  hedging.  In  the  final  section  implications  of  the 
findings are discussed, conclusions are drawn, and future research questions are suggested.
2. Risk management in the theory of economics
Despite rapid development of risk management theory and practice the very idea of 
risk management in general, and hedging in particular, is still being disputed1. In fact, there 
does not even exist one common definition of the term risk. Therefore, let us define the basic 
1 One of the most longstanding controversies, the distinction between hedging and speculation, is discussed at 
length by H. Working, Futures Trading and Hedging, “American Economic Review” 1953, Vol. 43, p. 314-340 
and L.  L.  Johnson,  The Theory  of  Hedging and Speculation in  Commodity  Futures,  “Review of  Economic 
Studies” 1960, Vol. 27, p. 139-151.
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definitions and scope of this discussion before we proceed any further. The focus of this paper 
is on financial risk uniquely – that is only speculative risks are taken into account. The nature 
of these risks is such, that they can bring about both gains and losses for the corporation; quite 
unlike pure risks, which by definition only yield losses. Moreover, since the focus here is on 
hedging, just the most common of speculative risks are taken into account, since only for 
these types of risks do derivative instruments exist.  Consequently,  we shall include in the 
analysis only foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk, commodity price risks, and stock price 
risk. As for management of these risks, the primary focus will be on hedging with the use of 
financial derivatives. Hence, we will deal only with a subsection of the whole process of risk 
management. Keeping in mind these restrictions, we define the risk management process as: 
“the process whereby organizations methodically address the risks attaching to their activities 
with the goal of achieving sustained benefit within each activity and across the portfolio of all 
activities”2. It is a central part of strategic management. The goal of risk management is to 
help the organization in achieving its goals, however they are defined. The question of what 
the goal of the corporation is, and whether hedging does contribute to the achievement of this 
goal, is where the dispute becomes most fervent and interesting. 
2.1. The corporation’s goal
Although  one  might  think,  that  after  over  two  centuries  of  the  development  of 
economic thought the matter of the goal of corporate actions would have been finally settled, 
this  is  still  not  the  case.  There  are  three  basic  approaches  to  the  question  of  corporate 
objective:  profit  maximization,  value  maximization  and stakeholder  benefit  maximization. 
Profit maximization, historically the earliest concept, seems to appeal to the popular public, 
but collapses under the scrutiny of an economist. First of all, this objective does not set any 
criteria  for  intertemporal  choice3.  Take  for  instance  a  pharmaceutical  company,  that  can 
decide to invest in research and development today to achieve higher profits tomorrow. Since 
research and development expenses increase costs, profit today will fall. Which option should 
the firm choose? – the profit criterion does not indicate that. More importantly however, profit 
maximization  is  not  feasible  in  an  uncertain  world.  When  managers  take  an  investment 
decision, it is not only the expected profit that changes, but the distribution of profits, which 
2 Federation of European Risk Management Assocciations,  A Risk Management Standard, http://www.ferma-
asso.org/Risk%20Managers%20section/Entreprise%20Risk%20Management%20Corporate%20Governance/RM
%20standard%20UK.15.11.04.pdf
3 M. C. Jensen,  Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function,  “European 
Financial Management” 2001, Vol. 7(2), p. 297-317.
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in this case are a random variable4. These problems are avoided, if value maximization is used 
instead. The management’s actions are directed then at raising market value of the firm – both 
the  value  of  shares  and  of  debt  –  and  this  allows  them to  choose  the  best  of  potential 
investments5. Nevertheless, this approach is still subject to criticism based on the inability to 
maximize  a  random variable  while  changing  its  distribution.  However,  in  this  case  it  is 
enough for the management to seek out decisions that lead to increases in value. Although 
such decisions may be suboptimal  in some instances,  they still  lead the firm in the right 
direction6.  An alternative approach to the objective function seems to have sprouted from 
stakeholder theory and has become popular under the name of a “balanced scorecard”. The 
aim  of  the  scorecard  is  to  provide  the  management  with  information  about  both  past 
achievements and future prospects of the firm, that is, not only with historical financial data, 
but  also  with  information  about  the  firm’s  productive  assets,  human  resources,  and 
satisfaction of various stakeholder groups. It may contain any of a number of indicators that 
show social, ecological and financial achievements of the company. Although the scorecard 
may indeed be a very useful  communication and management  tool,  it  does not provide a 
single score, which would definitely show whether the company is doing better or not. It is 
balanced only in the sense of incorporating a wide range of various indicators, but as Jensen 
argued – it is more of a dashboard than a scorecard7. It cannot tell the management how to 
trade off customer satisfaction against profits for shareholders, for instance. Consequently, it 
cannot possibly be used instead of the value maximization criterion, although it does serve as 
a useful complement8. 
2.2. Risk management in financial economics
In  the  field  of  finance  hedging  is  usually  discussed  within  the  framework  of  the 
Modigliani-Miller (MM) paradigm. In their landmark work published in 1958, MM showed 
using an arbitrage proof that the financial policy of a company is irrelevant for company value 
as long as certain classical assumptions are satisfied9. Consequently, hedging can only be of 
value to the firm if at least one of these assumptions is relaxed in the real world. The first of 
these assumption violations, discussed by MM themselves, was the existence of taxes and tax 
4 M. H. Miller, F. Modigliani, The Cost of Capital and the Theory of Investment, “American Economic Review” 
1958, Vol. 48, p. 261-297.
5 Ibidem.
6 M. C. Jensen, op. cit.
7 Ibidem.
8 Ibidem.
9 M. H. Miller, F. Modigliani, The Cost of Capital and the Theory of Investment, “American Economic Review” 
1958, Vol. 48, p. 261-297.
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shield produced by debt. If taxes do exist, then hedging can add value to the corporation by 
either enhancing firm’s debt capacity and providing a greater tax shield10, or ensuring fullest 
use  of  existing  tax  shield  benefits  by  keeping  profits  stable  at  a  sufficiently  high  level. 
Secondly,  hedging can also be beneficial to the firm by allowing it to budget its strategic 
investment expenses with confidence, which becomes important once costly outside financing 
is taken into account11. Next, in the real world transaction costs of bankruptcy do exist, as well 
as direct and indirect costs of other types of financial distress. Since hedging can lower the 
possibility of financial  distress,  it  also diminishes its’ expected costs,  thus raising value12. 
Finally,  if  we  allow  information  asymmetries  between  the  corporation  and  individual 
investors, the arbitrage proof itself is rejected – shareholders are no more able to hedge all 
risks by themselves, and therefore they can benefit from corporate hedging13. Although the 
consequences  of  relaxing  these  assumptions  provided  numerous  potential  rationales  for 
hedging, possibly even more interesting rationales for risk management arose from relaxing 
more fundamental ceteris paribus assumptions of the MM model.
In the 70s financial economics developed enough to depart from the traditional model 
of the financial world, where everything was homogeneous and all actors agreed unanimously 
on rational choices. Jensen and Meckling, in their 1976 paper, laid foundations for what may 
be seen as financial stakeholder theory, although their primary focus was on the separation of 
ownership and management14. The authors recognized that managers were motivated on the 
one hand by the marginal utility of perquisites, and by marginal utility of wealth on the other. 
Consequently, the value of a company owned by silent shareholders would be lower, than of a 
company owned solely by an owner-manager – the difference is termed agency costs. Later, 
Stulz developed a model to examine the influence of managerial contract structure on risk 
management strategies employed by the company15. He generally advocated that managers 
should be awarded stock instead of stock options, since the latter can motivate them to take 
excessive  risks.  He  analyzed  the  problem more  thoroughly  with  Smith,  by  incorporating 
differences in the shape of managerial marginal wealth function and marginal utility of wealth 
10 H.  E.  Leland,  Agency  Costs,  Risk  Management,  and  Capital  Structure,  “The  Journal  of  Finance”  1998, 
Vol. 53 (4), p. 1213-1242.
11 K.  A.  Froot,  D.  S.  Scharfstein,  J.  C.  Stein,  Risk  Management:  Coordinating  Corporate  Investment  and  
Financing Policies, “Journal of Finance” 1993, Vol. 48 (5), p. 1629-1658.
12 C. Smith, R. M. Stulz,  The Determinants of Firm's Hedging Policies, “Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis” 1995, Vol. 20 (4), p. 391-405.
13 M. H. Miller,  The Modigliani-Miller Propositions After Thirty Years,  “Journal  of Economic Perspectives” 
1988, Vol. 2 (4), p. 99-120.
14 M. Jensen, W. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 
“Journal of Financial Economics” 1976, Vol. 4, p. 305-360.
15 R. M. Stulz, Optimal Hedging Policies, “Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 1984, Vol. 19, No. 2., 
p. 127-140.
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function16.  Jensen  and  Meckling  examined  also  the  issue  of  wealth  distribution  between 
shareholders and debt-holders of the firm. In highly leveraged companies, the shareholders 
(and managers as their fiduciaries) have an incentive to raise the total risk of the company in 
hope of broadening the tails of the distribution of value (so called asset substitution). This 
problem stems from the fact, that in such cases it is the debt-holders who bear the larger part 
of  negative  consequences,  while  shareholders  capture  most  of  the  potential  profit. 
Consequently, if the company is committed to hedging, the agency costs of debt can be lower, 
and debt-holders do not have to demand covenants in order to avoid asset substitution. This 
line of analysis was also followed by Leland, whose model incorporated the asset substitution 
problem  while  also  taking  into  account  the  interdependencies  between  financing  and 
investment decisions17. He found that hedging can allow higher leverage and lower costs of 
debt, as well as lower expected costs of bankruptcy. 
2.3. Risk management in stakeholder theory
Many reasons  may  be  identified  for  companies  to  attempt  to  satisfy  different 
stakeholder groups, which is due to the breadth of the theory and of the definition of the 
stakeholder itself18. However, if we view stakeholder management as a means of ameliorating 
the firm’s chances of reaching its’ goal – value maximization – then risk management can be 
shown to have a  positive effect  on corporate value,  by taking into account the effects  of 
hedging on interests of various stakeholder groups. As it was discussed above, the two main 
groups of financial claimants can benefit from hedging: shareholders and debt-holders, but 
other groups may benefit as well. First of all, managers were also mentioned as extremely 
important stakeholders, who can affect firm’s performance to a great extent, and who actually 
decide upon the use of hedging instruments. In general however, hedging may be desirable for 
all stakeholders who hold illiquid assets, the value of which is dependant upon the firm’s 
financial condition19. Managers’ wealth is obviously a function of corporation’s risk, and they 
may require additional compensation for taking that risk – if the risk is decreased through 
hedging, the compensation may be lower20. Moreover, hedging may allow better assessment 
16 C. Smith, R. M. Stulz,  The Determinants of Firm's Hedging Policies, “Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis” 1995, Vol. 20 (4), p. 391-405.
17 H. E. Leland, op. cit.
18 R. E. Freeman, the founding father of stakholder theory, defined stakeholders as “any group or individual who 
can  affect  or  is  affected  by  the  achievement  of  the  organization’s  objectives”.  R.  E.  Freeman,  Strategic  
management: A stakeholder approach, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1984, p. 46.
19 S. Lim, H. C. Wang, “Firm Risk Management Policies: Financial Hedging and Corporate Diversification”, 
Academy of Management Proceeding 2001.
20 C. Smith, R. M. Stulz, op. cit.
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of  the  management’s  success  or  failure  by  eliminating  noise variation  in  company  value 
caused by volatility of an important financial variable, for instance the exchange rate, which 
can be easily hedged21. 
Secondly,  shareholders  may also benefit  from the existence of  block shareholders, 
usually original founders of the firm, who have invested a large portion of their assets in the 
company’s shares. Such shareholders are motivated to expend more efforts on monitoring the 
management, which is beneficial to also to other shareholders – agency costs are diminished. 
Lowering total  company risk lowers  the  risk of  block-holders  and provides an  additional 
incentive for them to continue holding their shares22. 
Thirdly, employees are another group vitally interested in the company’s prospects. 
The risk of  bankruptcy and financial  distress  obviously influences  their  expected  wealth. 
Moreover,  an  important  part  of  their  employment  contract’s  value  may  rest  in  so  called 
implicit claims – claims that are too complex and vague to be written down in a contract, such 
as promises of future training, career path and promotion possibilities. The provision of these 
claims  by  the  company  may  serve  motivational  purposes  and  increase  productivity23. 
Similarly,  implicit  claims may also be an important  part  of contracts  with suppliers,  who 
invest in modifications of their production and communication systems in order to cooperate 
more efficiently with the firm.  Finally, clients who purchase the firm’s products expect that 
they will be provided with warranty and post-warranty service, as well as exchange parts. In 
case of computer equipment, for instance, they will need to be reasonably sure that the data 
formats will not be discontinued, rendering their equipment useless, and that new, compatible 
equipment will be available in the future. These claims are also implicit, and conditional upon 
the firm’s existence.  If implicit  claims are indeed important  for the company’s  value,  the 
management will need to find means of assuring potential claimholders that their claims will 
be  respected.  One  way  to  achieve  this,  is  by  lowering  the  risk  of  financial  distress  by 
implementing a hedging strategy and communicating it to stakeholders24. 
3. Financial statement analysis of Polish corporations
Financial  statements  of  Polish  non-financial  listed  companies  for  the  tax  year 
beginning in 2003 were analyzed. The sample, restricted to companies listed at the Warsaw 
21 R. M. Stulz, Rethinking Risk Management, “Journal of Applied Corporate Finance” 1996, Vol.  9 (3), p. 8-24.
22 D. Fite, P. Pfleiderer, Should Firms Use Derivatives to Manage Risks? , In: W. Beaver, G. Parker eds., Risk 
Management: Problems and Solutions, McGraw-Hill, 1995, p. 61-76.
23 B. Cornell, A. C. Shapiro, Corporate Stakeholders and Corporate Finance, “Financial Management” Spring 
1987, Vol. 16, p. 5-14.
24 Ibidem.
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Stock  Exchange  with  headquarters  located  in  Poland,  from  sectors  other  than  financial 
services,  consisted  of  161  full  financial  statements.  The  choice  of  listed  companies  was 
motivated by the fact, that their ownership is dispersed, and that full financial reports are 
freely available.  The aim of the analysis was to determine the extent of derivative use in 
Poland and verify four research hypotheses: the decision to use hedging was expected to be 
positively correlated with company size, risk of bankruptcy, liquidity restraints, and existing 
growth options. 
3.1. The method
The analysis was performed in three steps: keyword analysis, statistical tests of sub-
sample  characteristics,  and  logit  regression.  The  purpose  of  keyword  analysis  was  to 
determine the values of four dependent variables – use of derivatives, declaration of their 
purpose,  declaration  of  risk  management  policy,  and  use  of  hedge  accounting  –  which 
assumed binary values of true or false. Variables were assigned truth values if a company 
respectively:
a. used derivative instruments,
b. declared hedging as the goal of derivative instruments use,
c. declared the existence of a risk management policy document,
d. used hedge accounting.
In order to assure reliability of results, a set of guidelines was established for determining 
whether these criteria were satisfied. Although only the decision to hedge, and not the extent 
of  hedging  was  the  object  of  analysis,  it  was  assumed  that  greater  involvement  in  risk 
management  would  be  reflected  in  more  variables  having  truth  values.  After  hedging 
instruments  users  were  identified,  financial  data  of  companies  were  collected  in  order  to 
verify the research hypotheses. The following independent variables were selected (Table 1).
Table 1. Independent variables
Variable Name Variable Description Proxy for
Revenue Net revenue from sales company size
BTMV Book to market value existing growth options
Leverage Degree of financial leverage risk of financial distress
Dividend Dividend per share liquidity constraints
Dps/Eps Dividend/Earnings per share liquidity constraints
L/Rev Liabilities/Revenue liquidity  constraints  and  risk  of 
financial distress
Profitability Operational profit/Revenue risk of financial distress (negative)
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Next, tests of mean values were effected between groups of companies that used derivatives 
and did not use them, as well as other groups selected basing on dependent variables’ values. 
At this  stage two largest  companies – PKN Orlen and TP SA – were removed from the 
sample as outliers; their revenues were incomparably higher than those of the rest of sampled 
firms. Both of these companies did use derivatives for hedging purposes to a high extent. 
Finally, logit regressions of dependent variables against all independent variables were carried 
out.
3.2. The results
Keyword  analysis  identified  only  46  (29%) companies  as  derivative  users.  Out  of 
these, 24 declared hedging as the purpose of derivative transactions (3 declared speculation), 
while 8 companies declared having a formalized risk management policy.  Surprisingly, only 
3 companies employed hedge accounting. Vast majority used only foreign exchange forward 
contracts purchased with their banks, with just a few companies using also over-the-counter 
options. Swaps proved to be dominant instruments for interest rate risk hedging, while futures 
were used exclusively to hedge exposures in prices of non-ferrous metals at the London Metal 
Exchange. 
Statistical  tests  of  means,  carried  out  between  groups  identified  in  the  keyword 
analysis,  showed  that  only  mean  values  of  revenue  and  profitability  were  significantly 
different (at confidence level of 5%) in the group of derivative users versus non-users (Table
2).  However,  higher  profitability  of  derivative  users  runs  contrary  to  the  hypothesis  of 
financial distress. Perhaps this result was due to risk management being associated with high 
management skills, which also resulted in better overall performance. Although at this stage, 
due to low number of derivative users, we decided to focus further analysis on the decision to 
use derivatives or not to use them, similar comparisons of mean values were subsequently 
effected between the groups of hedgers and other derivative users,  as well  as between all 
derivative users and companies that declared risk management policies. However, only the 
size variable was significant in the former case, while in the latter, it was significant but with 
a negative sign (contrary to the hypothesis and previous results), which may be due to the 
small number of companies  that  declared hedging policies – too low for the test  to yield 
reliable results.
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Table 2. Comparison of variable means in the group of derivative users and non-users
Derivative users N=44 Non-users N=114 Test of means
Variable mean st. dev. mean st. dev. test stat. p-value
 Revenue 821 682,66 1 155 563,10 268 909,13 395 602,52 3,1037 0,0010
BTMV 1,62 1,34 1,79 1,57 -0,5732 -0,7168
Leverage 1,62 3,55 1,66 3,71 -0,0686 -0,5273
Dividend 0,10 0,37 0,09 0,39 0,1180 0,4530
Dps/Eps 0,06 0,17 0,05 0,19 0,1416 0,4437
L/Rev 0,62 0,89 0,54 0,52 0,5490 0,2915
Profitability 0,06 0,08 -0,01 0,25 2,4948 0,0063
Note:  P-values  show  normal  distribution  critical  values  for  lack  of  reasons  to  reject  the  zero 
hypothesis of equal mean values in both groups.
Table 3. Comparison of variable means between groups of hedgers, and other derivative users.
Derivative users N=24 Declared hedgers N=20 Test of means
Variable mean st. dev. mean st. dev. test stat. p-value
 Revenue 455 657,79 458 648,22 1 260 912,50 1 547 611,83 2,2462 0,0123
BTMV 1,62 1,35 1,61 1,38 -0,0269 -0,4893
Leverage 1,36 1,53 1,93 5,05 0,4821 0,3149
Dividend 0,02 0,07 0,20 0,53 1,5264 0,0635
Dps/Eps 0,03 0,09 0,10 0,23 1,2503 0,1056
L/Rev 0,48 0,27 0,80 1,28 1,0952 0,1367
Profitability 0,05 0,08 0,08 0,08 1,2809 0,1001
Note:  P-values  show  normal  distribution  critical  values  for  lack  of  reasons  to  reject  the  zero 
hypothesis of equal mean values in both groups.
In view of the results of statistical tests, negative results of logit regression did not come as a 
surprise. It was only the revenue, as the proxy for size, that remained significant in various 
specifications of the equation – consequently, only company size was a significant factor for 
companies’ decision to use or not to use derivatives. Moreover, adding other variables did not 
improve the fit  of  regression results  with actual  data.  In fact,  results  of the regression of 
derivative  use  variable  against  revenues  were  themselves  far  from  satisfactory.  Out  of 
44 companies that did use derivatives, only 17 were identified correctly by the model, while 
there were as much as 18 false positives. The most probable cause of this problem was the 
non-normality of revenues distribution in the sample. However, poor specification may also 
have caused low degree of fit;  in  particular,  we may have failed to identify an unknown 
significant variable. This variable may be of financial nature, or other, such as managerial 
skills level or experience.
4. Discussion
It appears to be an irrefutable conclusion of our study, that risk management is still not 
as popular an issue in Poland as it is in Germany, Great Britain, or the United States. Whereas 
in these countries the proportion of companies using hedging instruments ranged between 
9
50% and 90% in the mid 90s25, and has been rising since then, only 29% of Polish listed 
corporates did use derivatives in 2003. Moreover, the analysis of means showed that size and 
profitability were the only characteristics that significantly distinguished derivative users from 
other companies,  while  logit  regression identified only size as statistically significant.  All 
other hypotheses were rejected, which may imply, that in cases of such rare use of derivatives 
it is not the theoretical rationales for hedging that motivate companies to engage in hedging 
activities.  Indeed, reasons for hedging may lie  exclusively in the ability of a company to 
overcome barriers  to  hedging.  It  is  very likely that  development  of hedging in Poland is 
obstructed by barriers which are present in foreign markets as well: lack of knowledge about 
hedging,  lack  of  skills  necessary  for  pricing  and  monitoring  hedging  strategies,  high 
transaction costs of over-the-counter instruments, unavailability or low liquidity of exchange-
traded  instruments,  problems  with  derivatives’  and  hedge  accounting.  While  larger 
corporations may find it easier to finance their hedging operations, which was indicated by 
significance of size in our analysis, the ability to overcome other barriers was not taken into 
account  in  our  study;  and  could  not  have  been,  due  to  lack  of  such  data  in  financial 
statements. 
The  existence of barriers to hedging notwithstanding, what is also surprising is the 
apparent lack of interest on the part of management in communicating their risk management 
strategies. Merely half of the corporations that did use derivatives indicated the goal they were 
used for – no matter whether it was hedging or speculation. Although there have not been any 
conspicuous cases of derivative losses in Poland, the news of the crisis at Procter and Gamble 
or Metallgesellshaft must have reached both managers, shareholders and other stakeholders. 
In  consequence,  one  would  expect  that  companies  did  explain  their  risk  management 
strategies thoroughly in their financial statements, but this was not the case. Notice, that only 
seven companies indicated that their hedging strategies were conducted within a framework 
of a formalized hedging policy, while any popular book on corporate hedging makes it clear 
that such a policy is a prerequisite for avoiding uncontrolled derivative losses. In fact, not 
only did the companies not describe their hedging policies, but they failed to mention risk 
management at all. The question arises, how many of Polish corporates have implemented any 
risk  management  processes?  If  many  have,  they  apparently  did  not  find  it  necessary  to 
communicate it to stakeholders. However, in the first section of this paper we have shown that 
in many cases risk management can be profitable for the company to a much grater extent, if 
25 C.  Mallin,  K.  Ow-Yong,  M.  Reynolds,  Derivatives  usage  in  UK  non-financial  listed  companies,  „The 
European Journal of Finance” 2001, Vol. 7, p. 63-91.
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it is communicated effectively to stakeholders. Only then can it serve to motivate stakeholders 
to invest more of their assets in the company and bind themselves closely with the firm. 
In conclusion, the results of our study show that risk management has not yet become 
a standard element of management in Poland, and is relatively popular only among larger 
firms.  Consequently,  any  research  conducted  along  theoretical  lines  is  bound  to  yield 
unsatisfactory results. However, results of our analysis imply the existence of other factors 
that  limit  growth  of  risk  management  in  Poland,  and  thus  direct  us  towards  new  study 
questions. First of all, it seems obvious from our observations, that it would be worthwhile to 
effect research aimed at identifying barriers to hedging and risk management development. 
Secondly,  one  could  inquire  how  popular  other  types  of  risk  management  are,  except 
hedging? Thirdly, the problem of the risk management process as such comes to our attention. 
Do Polish companies establish the process, or is risk management only occasionally brought 
up  within  other  processes?  And  finally,  why  is  risk  management  not  communicated  to 
stakeholders? Does this imply that it is not important to stakeholders, or that stakeholders’ 
perception  of  the  firm’s  risk  is  not  significant  for  the  management,  or  for  firm  value? 
Summing up, numerous new research questions arise as an outcome of this study. However, 
finding  answers  to  these  questions  will  pose  methodological  challenges,  since  publicly 
available data will not be sufficient. 
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